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ConsistenCy: ComParing random Weighting 
sChemes With exPert Judgments 
Martin C. Yu1 and Nathan R. Kuncel2
1. HumRRO
2. University of Minnesota - Twin Cities
Making correct hiring decisions can have far-reaching 
implications for ensuring organizational productivity and 
success. Evaluating job candidates often boils down to 
combining various pieces of information (e.g., simulations, 
roleplaying, interviews, and intelligence and personality 
tests) on job-related dimensions such as communication 
and leadership skills to form a judgment about candidates’ 
potential fit and performance on the job. Therefore, under-
standing the psychological and cognitive processes behind 
how these judgments are made would be imperative to 
maximize the predictive validity of our selection systems.
When combining information to make a judgment, 
there are typically two general ways to go about doing so. 
The first is the use of mechanical methods where informa-
tion is combined statistically/algorithmically using some 
predefined mathematical formula. The second is the use of 
clinical judgment, sometimes referred to as human, expert, 
holistic, intuitive, or subjective judgment. Here, expert 
judgments are made using the personal intuition or insight 
of the person making the judgment. In comparing the effi-
cacy of these two approaches, one of the most consistent 
findings in the judgment and decision-making literature 
has been that mechanical, algorithmic methods tend to out-
perform those made using expert judgment. This has been 
the case across a variety of decision making scenarios and 
across a variety of mechanical methods, including those as 
simple as unit weighting where predictor scores are simply 
added up (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove et al., 2000), and 
this holds true in the context of hiring and admissions de-
cisions (Kuncel et al., 2013). Although certain predictors 
can be highly valid, ultimately the method used to combine 
predictor information can serve to either maximize or limit 
the accuracy of the prediction system. As Hastie and Dawes 
(2001) stated:
a substantial amount of time and other resources is 
squandered on expert judgments that could be made 
more equitably, more efficiently, and more accurately 
by the statistical models we humans construct than by 
we humans alone. (p. 63)
On average, mechanical methods outperform human 
judgment, so ideally, predictive power would be maximized 
by using mechanical methods as much as possible. Howev-
er, there are considerations that may limit the use of algo-
rithmic judgment in reality. Although the use of algorithmic 
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and artificial intelligence systems in personnel selection is 
expected to increase (Putka & Dorsey, 2019), in practice, 
decisions made using clinical judgments have long been 
preferred over those made mechanically  (e.g., Highhouse, 
2008; Jeanneret & Silzer, 1998; Ryan & Sackett, 1987; 
Slaughter & Kausel, 2013). In addition to this preference, 
there are reasonable concerns regarding purely relying on 
mechanical methods, such as face validity, adoption of de-
cision aids, and candidate reactions (e.g., Diab et al., 2011; 
Eastwood et al., 2012; Kuncel, 2018). Simply put, people 
tend not to like being reduced to a set of numbers in and a 
number out, and decision makers often feel uncomfortable 
solely relying on an algorithm. Given these considerations, 
it may be more practical to improve and support human 
judgment rather than to try to replace it with mechanical 
methods. To that end, it will be necessary to better under-
stand why mechanical methods often have an advantage 
over clinical judgment in hiring decision making.
The lens model (Brunswik, 1952; Hammond, 1955) 
has been a well-established framework for analyzing hu-
man judgmental processes, and research with this approach 
has demonstrated that expert judgment is outperformed by 
mechanical methods of data combination and that this is 
explained by both use of inaccurate weights in combining 
predictor information (low cue sensitivity) as well as incon-
sistent use of these weighting policies (low cognitive con-
trol; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). The lens model equation 
(Tucker, 1964) describes the components that influences the 
accuracy of human judgment:
                       ____________                                 
ra = GRe Rs + C √(1 - Re2)(1 - Rs2)
Here, human judgment accuracy (ra) is a function of the 
accuracy of the judge’s policy for combining predictor 
information (i.e., cue sensitivity; G), the predictability of 
the criterion (i.e., environmental predictability; Re), the 
consistency with which the judge applies his or her own 
judgmental policy (i.e., cognitive control; Rs), and any ran-
dom or systematic error not captured by the lens model (i.e., 
unmodeled knowledge; C). When judges use optimal cue 
weights that reflect the actual predictor–criterion relation-
ships and/or use their weighting policy consistently, their 
judgmental accuracy will increase accordingly. The lens 
model has been used to examine multiple questions includ-
ing topics in the world of work (e.g., Schmitt et al., 1986).
Additionally, the human judge will best the mechanical 
model in prediction to the extent that there is unmodeled 
knowledge for which the judge is able to consistently and 
accurately incorporate into his or her judgments. For ex-
ample, if expert judges are able to validly account for red 
flags, interactions, or other non-linearities that may not be 
captured by a mechanical model, they would be able to 
maintain their ability to make valid predictions even though 
their judgmental policies will likely vary from case to case 
as they incorporate different pieces of information into their 
judgments or weigh information cues differently. To the 
extent that the human judge is able to validly account for 
any information not accounted for by a mechanical model, 
this would constitute valid use of expert insight to improve 
prediction. 
In the context of employment hiring decisions, there 
has been a heavy reliance on expert judgment in individual 
assessments due to what is essentially a belief that there is 
a substantial amount of unmodeled knowledge on which an 
expert judge is able to capitalize. Silzer and Jeanneret (2011) 
produced what is, to date, probably the most extensive de-
scription of all the skills and abilities that expert assessors 
supposedly bring to the table when conducting individual 
assessments. They make a number of bold claims about the 
use of expert judgment, including that expert assessors:
- “are accurate observers of behavior … can see and 
hear behavior in their observations of an individual that 
can provide useful and sometimes critical pieces of in-
formation to rating the individual on key dimensions” 
(p. 276)
- “can also formulate and test hypotheses about the in-
dividual. Using an analytical approach, they can probe 
and collect additional information relevant to a concern 
or a dimension” (p. 276)
- “can understand specific behavioral data points while 
also seeing larger behavioral patterns and psychological 
constructs” (p. 276)
- “can complete both normative and ipsative interpreta-
tions for the same variables for the same assessee that 
leads to a fuller understanding of that individual … a 
process that would be virtually impossible to complete 
in some mechanical or statistical manner” (p. 276)
- “can accurately sort behavior into key perfor-
mance-related dimensions” (p. 277)
- “can integrate information and accurately rate an indi-
vidual on specific performance dimensions” (p. 277)
- “can consider a range of behavior and determine how 
relevant the behavior is to later performance effective-
ness” (p. 277).
In summary, Silzer and Jeanneret (2011) claim that expert 
assessors are able to effectively exercise their intuitive 
judgment to validly integrate information in complex ways. 
However, their assertions have been challenged (Kuncel & 
Highhouse, 2011) and are not well supported by empirical 
evidence. Lens model research has shown that unmodeled 
knowledge tends to be very low, leaving little room, if any, 
for the expert to improve over a mechanical model (Karelaia 
& Hogarth, 2008).
Given that there is little unmodeled knowledge to ex-
ploit, the main drivers of judgmental accuracy as indicated 
by the lens model would then be the use of accurate predic-
Personnel Assessment And decisions
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tor weights and the consistency with which these weights 
are applied across judgmental cases. The issue with human 
judgment here is that even experts can lack insight into their 
own judgmental policies (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Clearly, 
it would be difficult to apply predictor weights accurately 
and consistently without a firm grasp of one’s own judg-
mental policy. This is where mechanical methods of judg-
ment shine because they can be programmed to consistently 
apply a single set of decision rules (e.g., predictor weights) 
across every single judgmental case. With mechanical 
methods, we know specifically what judgmental policy is 
being used and that it is being applied consistently. 
This raises the question of whether it is the use of ac-
curate (optimal) weighting schemes or the consistency with 
which a weighting scheme is applied that drives the predic-
tive power of a judgmental method, or if they are equally 
influential. Past evidence suggests that consistency is more 
important than optimality. Linear models are robust (Dawes, 
1979), meaning that changes in predictor weights do not 
drastically impact their predictive power as long as the 
signs on the weights do not change (i.e., positive weights 
stay positive, and negative weights stay negative). In mul-
tiple regression with three or more predictors, an infinite 
class of alternate regression weights (i.e., fungible weights) 
can be generated that yield a predictive validity approach-
ing that of the optimal set of predictor weights (Waller, 
2008). Moreover, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) found that, 
on average, a mechanical combination using random pos-
itive weights applied consistently across all judgmental 
cases was able to match or outperform human judges across 
five different judgment and decision-making scenarios. 
This study uses three real assessment data sets with job 
performance measures to examine how different simulated 
weighting schemes compares to expert judgment. This is 
an extensive extension of Dawes and Corrigan (1974) to 
more thoroughly study the degree to which inconsistency in 
combining information when making multiple judgments 
is detrimental to the predictive validity of expert judgment. 
Because the judgmental processes involve two aspects of 
data combination – the optimality of the data combination 
policy and the consistency with which the policy is applied 
– it would be necessary to tease apart consistency from op-
timality if the effects of consistency are to be studied. This 
can be done by examining random weighting schemes as 
there is no expectation of optimality and by pitting expert 
judgment against random weights in combining predictor 
information. When the intent is to make the most accurate 
judgment possible, randomly weighting information cues to 
make a judgment is the complete opposite of using a set of 
optimal regression weights.
There are two forms of random weighting that warrant 
consideration. The first form is the one used by Dawes and 
Corrigan (1974), where a set of random weights is generat-
ed and applied consistently to every single judgmental case. 
In a simulation study, this is repeated many times so that the 
average validity of consistent use of random weights can 
be estimated. The second form is inconsistent weighting, 
where a set of random weights is generated for every single 
judgmental case. Here, no two judgments are combined 
using the same weighting policy (unless by coincidence). 
Again, this process is repeated many times to estimate the 
average validity of random weighting. With consistent ran-
dom weights, there is no expectation of optimality, but there 
is an expectation of consistency. With inconsistent weights 
on the other hand, there is no expectation of either optimal-
ity or consistency.
Beyond Dawes and Corrigan (1974), where only the 
average validity of consistent random weights was evalu-
ated, the distribution of the predictive validities of random 
methods across all simulated iterations should also be 
examined and used to benchmark the predictive validities 
of non-random methods (e.g., simple unit weights and op-
timal weights) against expert judgment. Answering these 
questions will provide a stronger theoretical understanding 
regarding why mechanical methods tend to perform better 
than subjective expert judgment and will also provide prac-
tical insight into possible means of supporting and improv-
ing expert judgment.
In this study, we build on previous research and provide 
a more detailed examination of random weighting schemes 
and their implications for understanding the importance of 
exercising consistency in judgment and decision making 
processes. Using data from personnel assessments conduct-
ed at two separate companies by an international manage-
ment consulting firm, we run Monte Carlo simulations for 
the application of random weights consistently across all 
judgmental cases and for the application of random weights 
inconsistently across all judgmental cases. The validity of 
these composite scores made using these random methods 
for predicting assessment candidates’ future job perfor-
mance are compared to the validity of judgments made 
using non-random methods of data combination: subjective 
expert judgment, unit weighting via simple sums, and opti-
mal weighting. We examine not only the average validity of 
these random methods but also their variability across many 
simulated iterations. Based on these distributions, we would 
then be able to determine the extent to which non-random 
methods of prediction outperform or do not outperform 
these random methods.
Using this analytical approach, optimal regression 
weighting is expected to outperform the random weighting 
methods in almost all cases, save any case where the ran-
dom weights coincidentally approach the optimal weights. 
Unit weighting via simple sums is also expected to outper-
form inconsistent weighting in a large majority of cases. If 
sampling error in generating the consistent random weight-
ing schemes is distributed evenly about the unit weights, 
unit weighting would likely be better than consistent ran-
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dom weighting about half the time and worse the other half. 
Consistent application of a single set of random weights 
across all judgmental cases should yield more valid predic-
tions of job performance compared to inconsistent weight-
ing.
Given the importance of consistency as discussed 
previously, consistent random weighting is expected to 
outperform expert judgment in an overwhelming majority 
of cases. If we also see that inconsistent weights mirror 
the predictive power of expert judges, then we have strong 
evidence that the judges are using information very incon-
sistently and that this inconsistency in combining informa-
tion does not reflect utilizing expert insight and strategies 
specific to individuals, contexts, or jobs that improve their 
judgments. 
METHOD
Sample
Three archival assessment validation datasets were ob-
tained from an international management consulting firm1: 
(a) Company A, a financial services provider (231 candi-
dates evaluated by 26 assessors between 1994 and 1997); 
(b) Company B, a food retailer, Sample 1 (195 candidates 
evaluated by 23 assessors between 1980 and 1988); and 
(c) Company B, Sample 2 (421 candidates evaluated by 30 
assessors between 1989 and 1999). Sample 1 and Sample 
2 from Company B were obtained from separate validation 
studies. Candidates were evaluated for management posi-
tions by doctoral-level psychologists trained in conducting 
managerial hiring assessments.
Based on their performance on a mix of in-basket, 
interviews, leaderless group discussions, personality test, 
and cognitive ability test, candidates were rated on seven 
assessment dimensions: adjustment, administration, com-
munication, interpersonal, judgment, leadership, and mo-
tivation. Using these dimension ratings, the assessors then 
combined each of their candidates’ ratings on these dimen-
sions into an overall assessment rating based on person–job 
fit, such that employees who better fit with the job are ex-
pected to perform better on the job (e.g., Kristof-Brown et 
al., 2005). Supervisory ratings of job performance are used 
as the criterion variable.
Missing data were handled by multiple imputation with 
predictive mean matching (Schenker & Taylor, 1996). This 
method randomly samples donor values from neighbor-
ing observations that has a predicted value closest to the 
predicted value of the missing value. As it samples values 
from existing data, it maintains the plausibility of the im-
puted values compared to other regression-based methods. 
Using the MICE (Multiple Imputation by Chained Equa-
tions) package in R (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 
2011), five imputed datasets were generated for each of the 
three archival datasets, and analyses for each archival data-
set were pooled across all five imputed datasets.
Analyses were conducted using both listwise deletion 
and multiple imputation. Conclusions were the same for 
both methods of handling missing data. Because listwise 
deletion is the less preferable option (Newman, 2014) and 
for the sake of brevity, only results obtained via multiple 
imputation will be presented. 
Analyses
The analyses described in this section were conducted 
separately using each of the three validation datasets. To 
simulate the use of random weights applied consistently, a 
set of seven weights were randomly sampled from a uni-
form distribution that ranged from 0 to 0.5, inclusive. The 
weights sampled were constrained to be positive as the 
pairwise relationships between each dimension rating and 
the overall assessment rating were expected to be positive, 
and maintaining the same sign (i.e., positive or negative) 
for the weight is important for maintaining the predictive 
relationships (Dawes, 1979). They were also constrained to 
the 0 to 0.5 range to simulate correlational weights between 
individual assessments and job performance (Morris et al., 
2015), and to limit the degree to which each dimension 
could be differentially weighted. This same set of random 
weights was then used to linearly combine each candidate’s 
seven assessment dimension ratings into an overall assess-
ment rating. These overall ratings were then correlated with 
the candidates’ supervisory ratings of job performance as a 
measure of the predictive validity of applying a set of ran-
dom weights consistently. This process was iterated 10,000 
times, generating a total of 10,000 correlations as validity 
coefficients. Table 1 presents an example of a consistent 
random weighting scheme.
To simulate the use of inconsistent weights for each 
candidate, the dimension ratings for each candidate are lin-
early combined into an overall rating using a set of seven 
weights that were randomly sampled from a uniform dis-
tribution that ranges from 0 to 0.5, inclusive. As described 
previously, the weights were constrained to be positive. A 
new set of seven random weights was generated to combine 
the dimension ratings of each candidate into overall assess-
ment ratings. In this case, no two candidates were evaluated 
using the exact same weighting scheme (unless by coinci-
dence). Again, these overall ratings were then correlated 
with the candidates’ supervisory ratings of job performance 
as a measure of the predictive validity of applying inconsis-
tent weights. This process is iterated 10,000 times, generat-
ing a total of 10,000 correlations as validity coefficients. An 
1   The identity of the consulting firm is kept anonymous as the re-
sults of this study do not paint a positive picture. Their willingness 
to share the data that make this study possible is much appreciat-
ed. For readers who are somehow able to guess the identity of this 
firm, please note that these data are considered legacy data that 
do not necessarily reflect their current assessment practices. 
Personnel Assessment And decisions
5
2020 • Issue 2 • 1-10 http://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/pad/
ReseaRch aRticles
Consistent weights Inconsistent weights
Candidate W1 W2 … W7 W1 W2 … W7
1 .02 .36
…
.19 .35 .45
…
.12
2 .02 .36 .19 .15 .11 .28
3 .02 .36 .19 .43 .06 .33
4 .02 .36 .19 .04 .41 .31
5 .02 .36 .19 .22 .17 .09
Note. Randomly generated weights were constrained to be positive values between 0 and 0.5 as 
pairwise predictor–criterion relationships were expected to be positive.
TABLE 1.
Example Consistent and Inconsistent Random Weighting Schemes
example of an inconsistent weighting scheme is presented 
in Table 1.
To provide points of comparison with non-random 
methods, the predictive validities of overall ratings made 
using non-random methods – expert judgment, simple 
sums, and optimal weighting – were computed. First, the 
overall assessment ratings made using the assessors’ expert 
judgment were correlated with the supervisory ratings of 
job performance as a measure of the predictive validity of 
expert judgment. Second, simple sum overall ratings were 
calculated by adding up the dimension ratings. Correlating 
this with the candidates’ job performance ratings yielded 
the predictive validity of a unit weighted via simple sums 
composite. Last, optimally weighted overall ratings were 
calculated by first obtaining the optimal weights by ex-
tracting the regression coefficients from an ordinary least 
squares multiple linear regression model using the candi-
dates’ dimension ratings to predict their job performance. 
Each candidates’ dimension ratings were then linearly 
combined using these optimal weights into an optimally 
weighted composite. Correlating this composite score with 
their job performance yielded the predictive validity of an 
optimally weighted composite.
RESULTS
Figure 1 displays results for analyses using the Compa-
ny A data. Figure 2 displays results for analyses using the 
Company B, Sample 1 data; and Figure 3 displays results 
for analyses using the Company B, Sample 2 data. 
Comparing the non-random methods in predicting 
supervisory ratings of job performance at Company A, 
overall ratings made using optimal weights (r = .25) were 
better predictors than those made using simple sums (r = 
.19), which in turn performed about the same as those made 
using clinical expert judgment (r = .17). In Company B, 
Sample 1, optimal weights (r = .40) were better than unit 
weights (r = .33), which were better than expert judgment 
(r = .16), and a similar pattern was found in Company B, 
Sample 2 where optimal weights (r = .30) were better than 
unit weights (r =.22), which were better than expert judg-
ment (r = .13).
When the overall ratings computed using random 
methods were used to predict job performance at Company 
A, across 10,000 iterations, random weights applied consis-
tently across candidates had a mean predictive validity of 
r = .18 (SD = .02) and ranged from r = .10 to .22. Random 
weights applied consistently outperformed expert judg-
ments in 76.83% of the iterations, simple sums in 39.40% 
of the iterations, and never outperformed optimal weights. 
Inconsistent weighting across candidates had a mean valid-
ity of r = .09 (SD = .02), and ranged from r = -.01 to .19. 
Inconsistent weights never outperformed expert judgment, 
simple sums, or optimal weights. 69.85% of the iterations 
for inconsistent weights were outperformed by all of the 
iterations for random weights applied consistently.
At Company B, Sample 1 across 10,000 iterations, ran-
dom weights applied consistently across candidates had a 
mean validity of r = .34 (SD = .03) and ranged from r = .20 
to .40. Random weights applied consistently outperformed 
expert judgments in 100% of the iterations, simple sums in 
32.96% of the iterations, and never outperformed optimal 
weights. Inconsistent weighting across candidates had a 
mean validity of r = .16 (SD = .03) and ranged from r = .05 
to .27. Inconsistent weights outperformed expert judgments 
in 8.49% of the iterations but never outperformed simple 
sums or optimal weights. 94.05% of the iterations for in-
consistent weights were outperformed by all of the itera-
tions for random weights applied consistently.
At Company B, Sample 2 across 10,000 iterations, ran-
dom weights applied consistently across candidates had a 
mean validity of r = .24 (SD = .02) and ranged from r = .15 
to .29. Random weights applied consistently outperformed 
expert judgments in 100% of the iterations, simple sums in 
36.12% of the iterations, and never outperformed optimal 
weights. Inconsistent weighting across candidates had a 
mean validity of r = .12 (SD = .02) and ranged from r = .05 
to .20. Inconsistent weights outperformed expert judgments 
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FIGURE 1.
Density distributions of validities (10,000 iterations each) at Company A of predictor scores combined using random 
positive weights applied consistently (top plot) or inconsistently (bottom plot) across all candidates. Vertical lines are 
validities at Company A of non-random methods of data combination: expert judgment (solid line), unit weighting via 
simple sums (dashed line), and optimal weighting (dotted line).
FIGURE 2.
Density distributions of validities (10,000 iterations each) at Company B, Sample 1 of predictor scores combined using 
random positive weights applied consistently (top plot) or inconsistently (bottom plot) across all candidates. Vertical 
lines are validities at Company A of non-random methods of data combination: expert judgment (solid line), unit 
weighting via simple sums (dashed line), and optimal weighting (dotted line).
Personnel Assessment And decisions
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in 22.22% of the iterations but never outperformed sim-
ple sums or optimal weights. 96.69% of the iterations for 
inconsistent weights were outperformed by all of the itera-
tions for weights applied consistently.
DISCUSSION
Across the three samples, experts outperformed in-
consistent weights 100%, 91.5%, and 77.8% of the time in 
predicting subsequent job performance ratings in Company 
A; Company B, Sample 1; and Company B, Sample 2, re-
spectively. In turn, consistent weights outperformed experts 
76.8%, 100%, and 100% of the time. These results indicate 
that experts do not make judgments completely inconsis-
tently and are aware, to some extent, of what information is 
most valuable. However, their inconsistency in combining 
information does drastically damage their accuracy. This 
simulation study demonstrates that consistency in applying 
predictor weights is paramount to making accurate judg-
ments. 
It is striking that mindless consistency is enough to 
result in more accuracy than expert judgment. On average, 
random weights applied consistently resulted in better pre-
dictions than the assessors’ own judgments, which paral-
lels Dawes and Corrigan’s (1974) earlier study of random 
weighting. In the Company A analyses, consistent use of 
random weights dominated the experts in the majority of 
cases. In the analyses for both Samples 1 and 2 at Company 
B, consistent use of random weights completely dominated 
the experts. 
At this point, it is unclear what determines the extent to 
which consistent random weights will dominate over expert 
judgment, but it may be in part a function of the strength of 
the predictor–criterion relationships: Based on the predic-
tive validity of the optimal weighting schemes, it is clear 
that scores on these assessment dimensions are better at 
predicting performance at Company B than at Company A. 
However, both Company B samples show 100% dominance 
of consistent random weights over expert judgment, but 
the optimal validity and the validity of expert judgment at 
Sample 2 are both lower than those at Sample 1. Another 
possibility is that dominance is dependent on the differ-
ence between the validities of expert judgment and optimal 
weighting as this difference is larger in both Company B 
samples compared to Company A. More research across 
a larger number of samples will be needed to decipher the 
mechanism underlying this dominance effect.
Differences in the validity of expert judgment across 
FIGURE 3.
Density distributions of validities (10,000 iterations each) at Company B, Sample 2 of predictor scores combined using 
random positive weights applied consistently (top plot) or inconsistently (bottom plot) across all candidates. Vertical 
lines are validities at Company A of non-random methods of data combination: expert judgment (solid line), unit 
weighting via simple sums (dashed line), and optimal weighting (dotted line).
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the three samples were fairly small. However, the domi-
nance of expert judgment over inconsistent weighting was 
not the same. At Company A, expert judgment was com-
pletely better than inconsistent weights, but at both Compa-
ny B samples, expert judgment was not always better than 
inconsistent weights. Possible explanations include that 
the assessors at Company A were simply more consistent 
or incorporating mechanical approaches to their judgment, 
or there may be differences in the variability of candidate 
characteristics between each sample that may impact how 
well an inconsistent weighting scheme would perform. 
Further research will be needed to determine organizational 
and individual differences that may influence the differ-
ences in validity between clinical expert judgment and me-
chanical methods of judgment. Nevertheless, it is troubling 
that expert assessors are not always better than inconsistent 
weighting, as it suggests that they do not necessarily under-
stand what they are doing when combining information and 
evaluating candidates.
Ultimately, the finding that even random weights per-
form well when applied consistently suggests that consis-
tency in applying predictor weights is more important than 
the weights themselves. Linear models are quite robust, and 
as long as the signs on the weights do not change (as is the 
case in the present study where all weights were positive), 
changes in weights are not expected to drastically impact 
their predictive power (Dawes, 1979). As Waller (2008) 
demonstrated with fungible weights, it is possible to de-
rive an infinite number of alternate regression weighting 
schemes that yield a predictive validity almost as good as 
that of optimal weights (in multiple regression with three 
or more predictors). That being said, even though it is pos-
sible to generate a set of random weights that will perform 
very well when applied consistently, it can be difficult or 
impossible to tell how well that set of random weights will 
perform until the validation is conducted. In this simulation 
study, both optimal weights and unit weights via simple 
sums tend to perform better than random weights applied 
consistently. Practically speaking, if optimal weights are 
not known or cannot be approximated, it would be better to 
simply add up predictor scores instead of using an ill-de-
fined weighting scheme. 
The portion of inconsistent weights that produce 
composite scores that negatively predict job performance 
illustrate a primary concern of inconsistency in judgment. 
In these cases, configurations of random weights were gen-
erated such that there was some reversal of rank order. A 
candidate who would in reality have better job performance 
than another candidate is now predicted to have worse job 
performance. We know that this is not a reasonable predic-
tion. When inconsistency is introduced into a decision sys-
tem, options are no longer evaluated using comparable cri-
teria, which has the result of making comparisons between 
options meaningless. Because judgmental consistency is 
difficult to accurately quantify until after the judgment has 
already been made, any inconsistency should be considered 
undesirable.
All that said, our intention here is to simply demon-
strate the importance of consistency in making accurate 
judgments. Ultimately, our goal should be to improve con-
sistency in human judgment, and we are reluctant to argue 
that clinical judgment should be completely replaced with 
unit weights. Hastie and Dawes (2001) stated that “when-
ever possible, human judges should be replaced by simple 
linear models” (p. 62-63). Like them, we think an empha-
sis should be put on the “whenever possible.” Whereas 
mechanical methods are good for maximizing predictive 
power and minimizing costs and time, one concern is with 
face validity and reactions of both decision makers and the 
people affected by these decisions. Overall, people tend to 
perceive clinical methods of judgment to be more effective 
than mechanical methods, and mechanical methods have 
been described as unprofessional, impersonal, insufficient, 
inaccurate, unfair, and unethical (Diab et al., 2011; East-
wood et al., 2012). If useful decision aids are completely 
rejected or dismissed because of mechanical data combina-
tion, they cannot improve decision making. Adopting inter-
mediate or blended approaches may help improve decision 
making while retaining user acceptance. 
In practice, there are a number of ways in which the 
consistency of clinical judgments could be improved while 
maintaining the human aspect that many people strongly 
prefer. Here, we provide a sampling of methods for doing 
so. (a) Decision aids can be provided where judges enter 
weights that they themselves define into an algorithm. This 
would provide consistency and would likely improve pre-
diction. Our results suggest that for one of the companies, 
experts were on average somewhat better than inconsistent 
weights, which means that they are aware of weighting 
strategies that improve prediction. (b) A “model of man” 
can be obtained where the judge’s weighting policy is sta-
tistically estimated (Goldberg, 1970), and these weights 
can be entered into an algorithm or be provided back to the 
judge to allow him or her to better understand his or her 
own weighting policy. (c) Mechanical synthesis (Sawyer, 
1966) can be used to retain clinical judgments, which are 
then mechanically combined with the original predictors 
into a final composite score. (d) Mechanical methods can be 
used to initially screen candidates, after which experts can 
then apply their own judgment to selecting among the top 
candidates. (e) To the extent that there is an effective un-
derlying strategy, averaging the ratings of multiple experts 
would tend to reduce unreliability in weighting predictors 
and permit stronger correlations with relevant criteria. 
Additional research on these methods includes identify-
ing the methods that are most amenable to preserving pos-
itive reactions from everyone involved in a decision, eval-
uating the ability for each method to maintain predictive 
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validity, and developing new methods of supporting expert 
judgment. This would be valuable from both practical and 
scientific standpoints. For the former, this would improve 
the utility of decision systems that involve expert judgment, 
and for the latter, better understanding of how to improve 
expert judgment will lead to a better understanding of the 
basic processes underlying judgment and decision making.
It is possible that the expert assessors could have had 
more information about the candidates beyond scores on 
these seven assessment dimensions, such as their perfor-
mance on individual assessment activities, test profiles, 
and biographical information obtained from sources such 
as résumés and personal interaction. This could be viewed 
as an advantage that a human judge has over a mechanical 
method. Despite the possibility that the experts had this 
information available to them, they still performed worse 
than any mechanical method. Prior research has shown that 
although people tend to become more confident about their 
judgments with more information available, they are not 
always more accurate (Tsai et al., 2008).
Experts also potentially have insight into certain deci-
sions that are not easily captured by a simple linear model. 
In a selection context, in some cases it may be more critical 
to identify the worst candidates than it is to identify the best 
candidates. Therefore, having expert insight into rare-occur-
ring “red flags” not accounted for by the mechanical model 
(described by Meehl, 1954 as “broken-leg” cues) that sig-
nals whether a candidate possesses some fundamentally un-
desirable characteristic would provide crucial information 
in service of this goal. In evaluating such candidates where 
some red flag is highly diagnostic and overrides other infor-
mation, the expert who is able to detect this red flag would 
be expected to provide a more accurate assessment than the 
mechanical model.
Yet, although experts may have insight, over the long 
run mechanical methods come out ahead. This is seen in the 
present study where, on average, expert judgment is nearly 
perfectly aligned with inconsistent weights in one case and 
only modestly outperforms inconsistent weights in another 
case. The issue is twofold. First, opportunities for insight 
to truly make a substantial difference are likely rare. In the 
case of red flags (or broken-leg cues), they are themselves 
defined as being rare occurrences. Therefore, good predic-
tions using insight and bad predictions due to human error 
average out in the long run, and there are likely more op-
portunities to make errors than for insight to be important. 
Second, even with insight, people tend to overperceive and 
overgeneralize (Camerer & Johnson, 1991). Red flags tend 
to tell compelling stories, which leads to the inappropriate 
application of insight and to the neglect of relevant informa-
tion and common sense (Highhouse, 2008). In light of these 
issues, a question is whether and how expert insight can be 
effectively captured and applied. Mechanical judgments can 
be highly accurate, but they are unable to account for any 
rare event that has not been included in the model or algo-
rithm. Research into how expert insight can be effectively 
integrated with mechanical methods will hopefully further 
improve the predictive validity of our decision systems.
We note a couple limitations of our study. First, using 
a Monte Carlo simulation approach to generate random 
positive weights, we were able to examine the distributions 
of validities for the random-weighting methods. However, 
a more detailed analysis would have included distributions 
of validities of expert judgment across assessors in each 
dataset. Unfortunately, due to low within-assessor sample 
sizes, we could not be confident in the accuracy of validity 
estimates for individual assessors. We were therefore only 
able to examine assessors aggregated at each company and 
obtained a single average validity estimate across all asses-
sors at each company. Future research with more substantial 
data should examine assessor-level differences through a 
multilevel modeling framework. With this, it would also be 
possible to combine multilevel models with the lens model 
to examine any differences in how each assessor assigns 
weights to the assessment dimensions and how these differ-
ences in turn impact the judgmental accuracy of each asses-
sor (Kuncel, 2018).
Second, the effect sizes found in this study are like-
ly local to the sample used for analysis. We do show that 
there are validity differences depending on the company for 
which assessors conducted assessments, and it is possible 
that a similar study using a different data source will also 
show effect sizes that depart from those found in this study. 
Additionally, it is possible that the one assessor could have 
conducted assessments for multiple companies, and if a 
high performing assessor conducts assessments for multiple 
companies, he or she could sway the aggregate predictive 
validity to be higher, and the opposite could be true for a 
low performing assessor. Unfortunately, we lack the identi-
fying information in these archival datasets to be able to say 
for certain. That said, we expect that the substantive con-
clusions should hold, namely that mechanical methods of 
data combination on average outperform clinical judgment, 
and that judgmental consistency plays a large role in this 
because even random weights applied consistently often 
outperform clinical expert judgment a majority of the time.
In conclusion, no matter how strongly a set of predic-
tors relate to the criterion, the predictive power of a deci-
sion system is dependent on how information is combined. 
Consistency in weighting predictors across all judgments 
heavily contributes to maximizing predictive validity. The 
bad news is that human judges and even experts are often 
inconsistent. The good news is that there are methods that 
can retain human judgment and potentially reduce human 
error and improve the consistency of human judgment 
while avoiding negative reactions toward the use of me-
chanical methods. Further research into these methods and 
continual development of new methods of improving judg-
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mental consistency will ultimately improve our judgment 
and decision making processes, no matter the context.
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